The authors used 6-year longitudinal data from the Victoria Longitudinal Study (VLS) to investigate individual differences in amount of episodic memory change. Latent change models revealed reliable individual differences in cognitive change. Changes in episodic memory were significantly correlated with changes in other cognitive variables, including speed and working memory. A structural equation model for the latent change scores showed that changes in speed and working memory predicted changes in episodic memory, as expected by processing resource theory. However, these effects were best modeled as being mediated by changes in induction and fact retrieval. Dissociations were detected between cross-sectional ability correlations and longitudinal changes. Shuffling the tasks used to define the Working Memory latent variable altered patterns of change correlations.
What accounts for age-related changes in cognitive function, including episodic memory? One class of explanations entertained by gerontologists derives from a processing resource perspective (e.g., Craik & Byrd, 1982) , which claims that age changes in complex cognition are caused by age changes in basic information processing capacities and mechanisms needed as resources for executing complex cognitive operations (Horn & Hofer, 1992; Salthouse, 1991) . Individuals vary in the effectiveness and efficiency of basic cognitive processes brought to bear in service of complex task performance (such as episodic memory tasks). Salthouse (1991 Salthouse ( , 1996b emphasizes working memory, processing speed, and attention as basic primitives of the cognitive system, and our approach is broadly consistent with his perspective. We view resources in a more generic sense (see Zacks, Hasher, & Li, 2001 ), thereby including an additional set of influences. Some resources are fundamental and necessary (e.g., allocation of attention to the materials presented in the task), whereas others influence task performance but are optional and under the control of the participant (e.g., use of encoding strategies). Hence, individuals will differ in the ways they approach a task, and these differences can be influenced by aging (e.g., via attempts to compensate for age-related decline in relevant cognitive processes; Bäckman & Dixon, 1995) .
Adult cognition is often characterized by the critical role that experience, knowledge, and expertise play in determining successful performance (Ackerman, 1996; Baltes, Staudinger, & Lindenberger, 1999; Walsh & Hershey, 1993) . Encoding involves the dynamic interplay of processing new information in the context of prior knowledge (Cohen, 1989; Hambrick & Engle, 2002) . Such relations are most obviously manifested in comprehension and retention of information in narrative texts (Meyer, 1987; Radvansky, Zacks, & Hasher, 1996; Zelinski & Gilewski, 1988) or task contents that rely heavily on expertise (Ericsson & Charness, 1994; Masunaga & Horn, 2001 ). However, crystallized knowledge and verbal fluency predict simple list-learning tasks as well (e.g., Delaney, 1978; Hultsch, Hertzog, & Dixon, 1990; Kyllonen, Tirre, & Christal, 1991) . Knowledge held in semantic memory guides encoding and retrieval processes and provides a basis for integrating new information into existing knowledge structures. Moreover, age-related changes in accessibility and efficiency of queried knowledge structures may be associated with age-related changes in memory (Zacks et al., 2001 ).
Cross-Sectional Tests of Processing Resource Theory
In cross-sectional studies, development is indirectly measured in terms of cross-sectional age differences in the constructs of inter-est. Salthouse (1991 Salthouse ( , 1996b argued that age differences in episodic memory tasks are attributable to age differences in resource variables, such as speed of processing. The causal logic of the processing resource hypothesis cannot be directly tested by such criteria, because age is not experimentally manipulable. Instead it can only be indirectly evaluated by statistical control in a regression analysis framework. Age-related variance in working memory, fluid intelligence, and episodic memory is substantially reduced by statistical control for perceptual speed (e.g., Bors & Forrin, 1995; Bryan & Luszcz, 1996; Hertzog, 1989; Hultsch et al., 1990; Hultsch, Hertzog, Dixon, & Small, 1998; Lindenberger, Mayr, & Kliegl, 1993; Park et al., 1996 Park et al., , 2002 Salthouse, 1996a ; but see Graf & Uttl, 1995; Light, 1996; Zacks et al., 2001) .
The cross-sectional models of processing resources and memory performance just described capture individual differences in agerelated cognitive change only in a weak sense. One's interpretive focus is, in effect, on partialled chronological age curves for memory performance, controlling for age differences in resources (see Lindenberger & Pötter, 1998) . However, individual differences in rates of cognitive change are only one component contributing to cross-sectional variance on a given task (Hertzog, 1985; Hofer & Sliwinski, 2001) . Moreover, individual differences in change, expressed as deviations of an individual's change from the average age curve, cannot be identified in cross-sectional data. The proportion of cross-sectional variance predicted by average intraindividual change and by individual differences in age-related change could well be overshadowed by stable correlations among cognitive variables (that could have been observed also at, say, age 20). Indeed, cross-sectional variation in cognition could be least influenced by individuals' differential rates of change.
Longitudinal Tests of Processing Resource Theory
For the reasons just provided, evaluation of processing resource theory benefits from the analysis of longitudinal data. We gain a better understanding of age-related changes in episodic memory if we can show that changes in resource variables predict episodic memory change in later life (Hultsch et al., 1998; Zelinski & Stewart, 1998) . To date, longitudinal data have not strongly supported the argument that individual differences in speed of processing are an important predictor of age changes in episodic memory (Hultsch et al., 1998; Sliwinski & Buschke, 1999; Wilson et al., 2002; Zimprich, 2002) . For example, Sliwinski and Buschke (1999) used mixed-model analysis to ascertain whether covarying on change in speed of processing eliminated or reduced individual differences in episodic memory change. Longitudinal changes in speed significantly predicted change in other cognitive measures, but significant longitudinal changes in memory remained after controlling for changes in speed of processing. Whereas about 75% of the cross-sectional age differences in a composite memory measure was mediated by processing speed, only about 10% of its longitudinal change variance was mediated by changes in processing speed.
Structural equation models from the Victoria Longitudinal Study (VLS) reported by Hultsch et al. (1998) were even more striking in this regard.
1 Their latent variable models examined relationships among change in multiple cognitive variables, thereby correcting estimated covariance among change factors for measurement error. Latent variables of 6-year change were constructed by implicit computation of a 6-year latent difference score (McArdle & Nesselroade, 1994) . The critical predictor of longitudinal changes in episodic memory was longitudinal changes in working memory, as measured by a Sentence Construction task. Changes in the Working Memory latent variable were also strongly correlated with changes in world knowledge (Fact Recall) . This latent variable was defined by two versions of a task requiring answers to world knowledge questions. A surprising longitudinal outcome was that individuals who were experiencing decline in working memory and episodic memory were also experiencing declines in access to facts in semantic memory. The latter variable is generally considered relatively immune to aging effects across most of the adult life span (e.g. Horn, 1985) . This outcome was consistent with evidence on dedifferentiation of cognitive constructs in old age (e.g. Baltes et al., 1999; Hertzog & Bleckley, 2001 ) as well as with more recent trends in theorizing about age changes in working memory and episodic memory that emphasize susceptibility to interference and degraded access of retrieval processes to information held in memory (Light, 1996; Zacks et al., 2000) .
Effects of Measurement Choices on Models Testing
Resource Theory Hultsch et al. (1998) assessed change in perceptual speed and working memory with complex semantic response time (RT) tasks and the Sentence Construction task, respectively, instead of measures of processing speed and working memory favored by Salthouse (1991 Salthouse ( , 1996b . Thus, one reason for the discrepancy between the longitudinal outcomes just reviewed and cross-sectional studies could be a function of differences in measurement between different studies. Indeed, evidence from the VLS shows that the choice of measures of working memory affect conclusions drawn from cross-sectional tests of processing resource theory.
Originally, the VLS measurement battery included two measures of working memory-a Sentence Construction task and an N-Back task (see Hultsch et al., 1990 Hultsch et al., , 1998 . At the second testing in 1989 (Wave 2), Salthouse and Babcock's (1991) Computation Span and Listening Span measures were added to the study. The Sentence Construction task is similar to Daneman and Carpenter's (1980) Reading Span task, with an important difference. On each trial, individuals listen to multiple sentences in series and respond to comprehension questions after each sentence. They do so while attempting to hold the last word of each sentence in working memory. These words, in turn, form a sentence, and at the end of the trial individuals report the sentence implied by the target words. Given that the Sentence Construction and N-Back tasks did not correlate highly (Hultsch et al., 1998) , the longitudinal analyses for Sample 1 focused exclusively on the Sentence Comprehension task as the indicator for Working Memory. However, as noted and critiqued by Salthouse (1991) , this task allows individuals to use semantic processes to assist in maintenance of the target words through construction of the target sentence. Hultsch et al. (1998) reported cross-sectional models for Wave 2 of the VLS Sample 1, using either Sentence Construction or the two Salthouse working memory measures, Listening Span and Computation Span, to index working memory. Using the two Salthouse measures to define Working Memory dramatically reduced prediction of episodic memory by working memory. This reduction was not a function of the fact that Sentence Construction lacks convergent validity with the Salthouse working memory measures. The Sentence Construction task correlated better than .5 with both Salthouse tasks, and a confirmatory factor model showed that Sentence Construction, Listening Span, and Computation Span all had significant loadings (.6 or greater) on a Working Memory factor. The difference in modeling outcomes was also not determined by different sensitivity to age effects; the age curves for the working memory measures were highly similar. Instead, the difference could be attributed to differences between working memory measures in relations to speed (higher for the Salthouse measures) and other abilities (generally higher for Sentence Construction).
These findings indicate a substantial impact of how one chooses to measure working memory on outcomes from the processing resource model. Similar concerns apply to the measures of information processing speed. Hultsch et al. (1998) used measures of semantic information processing speed to measure the processing speed construct. Age-related changes in semantic processing speed may be smaller than nonsemantic processes (e.g., Hale & Myerson, 1996) and may be more associated with speed of access to semantic memory (Hunt, 1978) , thereby altering patterns of shared covariance among speed, working memory, and the verbal episodic memory measures used in the VLS (see Salthouse, 1991) .
The VLS added a second sample in 1992. Assessment began with an expanded measurement battery that included several tests of perceptual speed, the Salthouse Computation Span and Listening Span working memory tasks, and psychometric tests of inductive reasoning-along with the same measures of verbal episodic memory (word and text recall). This feature allowed us to construct longitudinal tests of the processing resource account of cognitive aging using measures that directly parallel the large body of work produced by Salthouse and his colleagues using 6-year latent change models for the second VLS sample.
Latent Change Models for Adult Cognition
The latent change models used in this article provide a means of estimating change in latent variables, as defined by confirmatory factor analysis. A general requirement for this approach is that each latent variable be measured by multiple indicators that empirically converge to define the latent variable. Given an adequate definition of each latent variable by multiple indicators, the latent change model analyzes the covariance structure of the latent variables by specifying latent level and change factors. Thus, the model can be conceptualized as consisting of two parts: (a) a longitudinal factor model that defines the latent variables at one or more occasions (waves) of measurement and (b) a structural equation model that specifies latent level and change factors for each variable and specifies how changes in the latent variables are interrelated (for example, as predicted by a processing resource account).
The longitudinal factor model consists of a relatively standard specification of factors at two or more occasions of measurement (Alwin, 1988; Hertzog & Schaie, 1986; Tisak & Meredith, 1990) . Not all variables need to be measured at all occasions. For variables that are repeatedly measured, the model typically assumes that the same configuration of relationships between observed variables and latent variables exists at both points in time, although this assumption can be relaxed if appropriate. The longitudinal factor model can be used to test for longitudinal invariance in the underlying factor structure of the variables (Alwin, 1988; Schaie & Hertzog, 1985) through the use of chi-square difference tests on nested models. For example, to test the hypothesis of invariant factor loadings (regressions of variables on factors) one specifies a model with the standard configuration and a more restricted model that requires that the numerical values are constrained equal across measurement occasions (see Hertzog & Schaie, 1986; Horn & McArdle, 1992) . The difference in chi-square values between the two models tests the null hypothesis that the factor loadings display metric invariance over time (Meredith, 1993) . Other hypotheses (e.g., invariance in factor correlations across occasions) can also be tested (Tisak & Meredith, 1990) . A key feature of longitudinal models is that one can specify covariances among the residuals of the same variable over time (Sörbom, 1975 (Alwin, 1988; Hertzog & Nesselroade, 2003; Hertzog & Schaie, 1986) . They indicate the consistency of individual differences in a latent variable and indirectly reflect individual differences in change. When there are no true individual differences in change, these stability coefficients will be 1.0. Values of 1.0 can be obtained from such models because the latent factor correlations have been corrected for random and systematic measurement error. The stability of cognitive factors is often quite high in longitudinal data, especially when stability estimates are corrected for measurement error (Hertzog & Schaie, 1986; Hultsch et al., 1998; Zelinski & Stewart, 1998) . A requirement for valid latent change models is that the stability coefficients are less than 1.0, so that the implied variance in latent change is greater than 0.0.
Given a satisfactory longitudinal factor model, the latent change model restructures the occasion-specific factors with respect to latent level and change factors. That is, each latent variable is extended by a fixed-1 regression coefficient to its corresponding level factor, and each latent variable at the second occasion of measurement is used to define a change latent variable. The residual variance of the occasion-specific factor is fixed to zero, accomplishing the extension into the latent change space. In the case of Working Memory (WM),
where WM1 is the Working Memory latent variable at Wave 1 and WM2 is the Working Memory latent variable at Wave 2. These equations implicitly define the latent change variable as the difference between the two waves, that is, WM2 Ϫ WM1.
This alternative measurement specification has several advantages. Difference scores for the empirical measures, like Sentence Construction, are never computed. Instead, the covariance matrix of the observed variables is analyzed according to the latent change specifications. This avoids problems associated with measurement error known to create a problem for simple difference scores (Rogosa, Brandt, & Zimowski, 1982) . More critically, the covariance matrix of the latent level and change factors are estimated rather than the covariance matrix of the occasion-specific factors. The advantage of directly specifying the latent change factors is that one gets both a parameter estimate for individual differences in latent change and a standard error of estimate for the parameter. Thus, one can directly test the hypothesis that the variance in latent change is greater than zero for a given latent variable. Furthermore, one directly estimates covariances of latent change between different latent variables (along with associated standard errors). Thus, one can evaluate in a straightforward way whether changes in two latent variables are significantly correlated. The latent change specification also makes it possible to formulate and estimate structural equation (regression) models that account for change in one latent variable (e.g., Episodic Memory) in terms of change in other latent variables (e.g., Perceptual Speed, Working Memory). Regressing change in one variable on change in a predictor variable is not possible with standard autoregressive models for panel data (e.g., Alwin, 1988 )-change is not directly specified as a variable in such models. As with the initial VLS study (Hultsch et al., 1998) , the structural equation models we estimated were inspired and informed by existing cross-sectional models based on processing resource theory (e.g., Salthouse, 1996b) .
We do not index change by chronological age, and we estimate no specific age function for the variables in question. Age is not ignored-it is used as a predictor variable (covariate) in the analyses, which therefore accounts, indirectly, for age-related trends over time. Implicitly, the latent change models assume linear change within a person over the 6-year time interval, but a systematic relationship between age and magnitude of change implicitly defines a nonlinear age function across the age range spanned by the sample under study. The factors representing initial level of performance were allowed to covary freely (i.e., they are treated as inert exogenous variables) and the focus was placed only on a structural equation model for the latent changes.
The latent change models we report here include only two occasions of measurement and do not estimate (or fit) the variables' means. The minimalist nature of these change models can be contrasted with latent growth curve models in longitudinal studies that (a) utilize the means to define an aggregate latent growth curve and specify individual differences in change as deviations from that aggregate curve; (b) utilize multiple occasions of measurement; and (c) utilize all available data, assuming invariance in the functional form of developmental change for those who remain in and those who drop out of the longitudinal study (e.g., McArdle & Bell, 2000) . These models are both more elegant and also potentially more problematic, in terms of the assumptions they make about adult developmental change (see Hertzog & Nesselroade, 2003) . The latent change models we report are probably biased because of selective survival in a longitudinal study (if one assumes that individual differences in change will vary according to variables such as pathological brain disease or health status; see Sliwinski, Hofer, & Hall, 2003) . However, given the possibility of qualitative differences between pathological and normal subgroups, it is an open question as to whether one should attempt to generalize to the population as a whole in studies of adult developmental change (Nesselroade & Labouvie, 1985) . Our latent change models do not require homogeneity of functional form and do not make convergence assumptions for cross-sectional age differences and longitudinal age changes. Convergence assumptions stipulate that cross-sectional age differences and longitudinal age changes can be combined to estimate an aggregate (average) developmental function. As such, latent change models allow indirectly for the possible disagreement of cross-sectional and longitudinal patterns of individual differences, and they do not allow estimates of individual differences in change to be influenced by cross-sectional age differences.
A practical advantage of the latent change approach is that one can accommodate a larger number of latent variables in the model, which is critical for our test of complex processing resource models for cognitive aging. We did not use data from the second wave of the VLS in these models; that is, we used only data from Wave 1 and Wave 3 to estimate 6-year longitudinal change. Although this is potentially limiting, in terms of characterizing change (one is reminded of Rogosa's [1988] warning that two occasions are not necessarily sufficient for longitudinal studies), our choice reflects a tradeoff between the need to maintain a reasonable ratio of sampled cases to estimated parameters in a structural equation model (Bentler & Chou, 1987) . In many growth curve applications, there are a large number of occasions and one or only a few latent variables. Interest centers on describing the functional form of change over time. In the VLS, the multivariate orientation toward measurement and the focus on multiple cognitive abilities so as to be able to evaluate differential change constrains the number of variables that can be included in a model. One method for dealing with this issue is to omit Wave 2 variables and to restrict analysis to critical cognitive variables. Given that 3 years may be too short a retest interval to reliably estimate individual differences in cognitive change in samples of normal, community-dwelling older adults (Zelinski & Burnight, 1997) , the decision to omit the middle occasion of measurement from our models may also assist with empirical identification of the latent change parameters.
Method
This article is based on longitudinal data from Sample 2 (Waves 1-3) of the VLS. The general design of the VLS consists of longitudinal sequences in which multiple cross-sectional samples of community-dwelling middleaged and older adults are retested at intervals of 3 years with new samples added at intervals of 6 years. The design, participants, measures, and procedures of the VLS have been described extensively elsewhere (see Dixon et al., in press; Hultsch et al., 1998) ; only pertinent components of the method are summarized here.
Participants
Of the original 530 adults tested in 1992-1993, longitudinal data were analyzed for 303 individuals (189 women, 114 men) ranging in age from 61 to 91 years (Wave 3: M ϭ 73.2, SD ϭ 6.9), who completed all relevant measures across a 6-year period. Thirty individuals had incomplete data across the three waves and were excluded from further analysis. The returning participants exhibited the typical selectivity of longitudinal sam-ples compared with the general population. Within the sample, 91.4% had completed at least 11 years of education and 60.4% had completed at least 14 years of education. Comparable figures for the Province of British Columbia are 51% and 18%, respectively (Statistics Canada, 1998) . The average education level of the sample was 15.32 years (SD ϭ 2.99). Over 89% of the participants rated their health as very good or good on a 5-point scale (0 ϭ very good, 1 ϭ good, 2 ϭ average, 3 ϭ poor, 4 ϭ very poor). The average participant reported 2.27 (SD ϭ 1.81) physician-diagnosed ailments from a list of 26 potential chronic health conditions (e.g., heart attack, stroke, diabetes, cancer).
Participants dropped out of the sample for various reasons. Nine individuals did not complete the initial measurement wave and were excluded from further consideration. Of the 188 individuals who dropped out of the study after the first occasion of measurement, 29 died, 59 had personal or family health problems, 4 had memory problems, 48 were busy or not interested, 21 moved, and 27 could not be located. We examined attrition effects separately for (a) demographic characteristics and (b) select cognitive variables by using a 2 (gender) ϫ 2 (attrition status) multivariate analysis of covariance partialling the influence of chronological age. For each set of variables, baseline performance for the 303 participants who returned for all three waves of testing was compared with the 188 individuals who did not continue after Wave 1. For the demographic characteristics, significant omnibus effects were observed for Gender, Wilks's ϭ . Observed patterns for the nonsignificant findings were in the expected direction. Findings from both the demographic and cognitive variables confirm that returning participants were more highly educated, healthier, and more cognitively select.
Measures and Procedure
The VLS measurement battery consists of multiple questionnaires, tests, and tasks designed to measure both cognitive variables (including experimentally based information processing components and psychometrically based abilities) and noncognitive variables (e.g., self-reported health). The test battery was administered during four testing sessions (two group and two individual) scheduled over a period of about 4 -6 weeks. Tasks were administered in the same order to all participants. For the recall measures of Word Recall, Text Recall, and Fact Recall, six alternate forms were created, with two forms administered at each of the three longitudinal occasions. Participants were randomly assigned to receive one of the three sets of tests (which formed the basis for a partial Latin square to counterbalance the order of the set administration in future longitudinal assessments). In the following section, we describe only those variables used in the structural regression analyses reported in this article (see Hultsch et al., 1998 , for a full description of the complete battery).
Word recall. This variable consisted of immediate free recall of two lists of 30 English words selected from the total set of six lists. Each list consisted of 6 words from each of 5 taxonomic categories (e.g., birds, flowers) typed on a single page in unblocked order. Participants were given 2 min to study each list and 5 min to write the words in any order. Recall was scored as the number of correctly recalled words for each list.
Text recall. This variable was measured by immediate gist recall of two narrative stories about an event in the life (or lives) of an older adult (or couple). The total set of 6 stories was selected from a larger set of 25 structurally equivalent texts developed by Dixon, Hultsch, and Hertzog (1989) . Each story was approximately 300 words and 160 propositions long. The stories were presented in typed booklets for study followed by written recall. Participants were given 4 min to read each story and 10 min to write their recall. Recall protocols were scored by using criteria described in Dixon et al. (1989) . Rater agreement across all possible pairs of scorers at all waves of measurement exceeded 90%. Story Recall was scored as the total numbers of gist propositions recalled from each story.
Fact recall. This variable was measured by two sets of 40 questions that tested individuals' recall of world knowledge. The questions were drawn from the domains of science, history, literature, sports, geography, and entertainment (Nelson & Narens, 1980) . The items were presented in booklets, and participants wrote their answers under self-paced timing conditions. Recall was scored as the number of correct items from each set.
Vocabulary. A 54-item multiple-choice (recognition) vocabulary test was created by concatenating three 18-item tests from the Educational Testing Service Kit of Factor-Referenced Tests (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Dermen, 1976) . For the structural equation models, the test was divided into two randomly assigned halves, using the number of correct responses for each set as variables.
Working Memory. This variable was indexed by three tasks. In the Sentence Construction task, participants were asked to read aloud a series of sentences while keeping in memory a key word from each. When combined at recall, the key words from the series formed a new sentence. Twelve series of increasing length (three trials at series lengths three, four, five, and six sentences) were presented. The measure consisted of the number of new sentences correctly reported. Two working memory tasks developed by Salthouse and Babcock (1991) were also administered. In Computation Span, participants solved arithmetic problems while holding one number from each problem in memory for later recall. In Listening Span, participants listened to orally presented sentences and wrote answers to simple questions about each sentence while retaining the last word of each sentence for later recall. For both tasks, the number of items (problems, sentences) increased from 1 to 7, with three trials at each series length. Working memory span was scored as the highest span (1-7) correctly recalled on two out of three trials.
Inductive Reasoning. This variable was measured by the Letter Sets Test from Ekstrom et al. (1976) and the Letter Series Test from Thurstone (1962) . In the Letter Sets Test, participants determined which one of five sets of letters would not fit the rule that made the others alike. In the Letter Series Test, participants were presented with a series of letters and were asked to identify the next letter in the series according to the rule that determines the sequence. The measures consisted of the number correct on each task.
Perceptual Speed. This latent variable was defined by two timed tests from the Kit of Factor-Referenced Cognitive Tests (Ekstrom et al., 1976) . Both tasks required participants to make simple perceptual comparisons as rapidly as possible within a limited time period. In Identical Pictures, participants chose which one of five line drawings matched a target figure. In Number Comparison, participants indicated whether two strings of digits are identical or not. Speed was scored as the number of correctly completed items.
Choice Reaction Time (CRT).
For CRT, a 3 ϫ 3 grid matching the numeric keypad of the computer was displayed on the screen. This array was used to instrument 2-, 4-, and 8-choice RT trials. The center square, corresponding to the center key (5) in the numeric keypad served as the home key for the participant's right forefinger. Twenty trials were presented for arrays of 2, 4, or 8 squares, administered in blocks of 10 trials. One square contained an O and all the others contained Xs. Participants pressed the key corresponding to the O's location. Median latencies for the 4-choice and 8-choice conditions were used as the measures.
Statistical Procedure
The raw data for all persons with complete cognitive measures were converted to a longitudinal covariance matrix that was analyzed by using LISREL 8.20 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996) . Maximum likelihood estimation was used, and model fit was evaluated by the likelihood-ratio chi-square test and two goodness-of-fit indices, Bentler's (1990) comparative fit index (CFI) and Steiger's (1990) root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA). A CFI higher than .95 and an RMSEA below .05 are considered excellent levels of model fit.
Results

Longitudinal Factor Models
The analysis began with a longitudinal factor analysis for data from Waves 1 and 3. Initial level and change factors were specified for eight latent variables: Working Memory, Choice RT, Perceptual Speed, Induction, Fact Recall, Word Recall, Text Recall, and Vocabulary. Age was also included as a variable. In Table 1 we report the correlations, standard deviations, and means of the relevant variables for the sample of 304 persons with complete data on these variables. The model specification was informed by work on the VLS Sample 1 (Hultsch et al., 1998) . Given that we had defined each recall latent variable (Fact Recall, Word Recall, Text Recall) by two versions of the recall task (with different stimuli), we treated these measures as tau-equivalent forms (Hertzog & Nesselroade, 1987) . That is, both indicators of each recall factor had fixed one loadings on the latent variable at both Waves 1 and 3 (see Hultsch et al., 1998) . All other factors were identified by an arbitrarily selected, fixed-1 loading of one indicator on the factor. The remaining, freely estimated factor loadings were constrained equal over time (i.e., between Waves 1 and 3). The model also specified autocorrelated error terms for each measure over time (excepting the recall measures). This model fit the data well, 2 (426)ϭ 566.82, RMSEA ϭ .029, CFI ϭ .982. Not all the correlated residuals were reliably different from zero, but they were retained in the model to provide symmetry in specification and to avoid bias in estimated factor variances and covariances. Given the changes in the cognitive variables from Sample 1, we did check on the assumption of equal factor loadings over time (metric invariance; Meredith, 1993) from the VLS Sample 1 had also detected small to moderate negative correlations of level and change, indicating that people with the highest scores at Wave 1 tended to show greater 6-year longitudinal decline in cognition. These correlations were smaller in the present sample. Table 3 provides the correlations among the initial-level factors, including age. These disattenuated correlations are corrected for measurement error. The relative magnitudes of the correlations were consistent with expectations based on prior research on human abilities. Perceptual Speed and Induction had the largest correlations with age. Vocabulary and Fact Recall, typically considered markers of crystallized intelligence, correlated highly, as did the Word Recall and Text Recall factors. Induction correlated highly with most other variables, including Working Memory (see Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999) . These two variables are typically considered good markers of fluid intelligence.
The initial-level factor correlations were relatively large, which is also consistent with the literature. Older adult samples typically produce substantial cognitive factor correlations (e.g., Hertzog & Bleckley, 2001; Hertzog & Schaie, 1986; Schaie, Maitland, Willis, & Intrieri, 1998) , which may reflect a type of dedifferentiation of the factor structure of cognitive and intellectual abilities in old age. Furthermore, the VLS sample spans a 30-year age range and there are substantial correlations of chronological age with all factors. These consistent age trends will tend to increase factor correlations in age-heterogeneous samples.
Next, we specified a model with latent Level and Change factors for all cognitive constructs. This model is a simple rescaling of the longitudinal factor model and had identical fit. In Table 4 we report the estimated variances of the eight latent variables from the longitudinal factor model, the longitudinal covariance of each latent variable with itself over time (i.e., the covariance of the same variable at Wave 1 and Wave 3), the estimated variance of each level factor and each change factor, and the rescaled stability coefficient (correlation of factors between Wave 1 and Wave 3). The ratio of estimated change variance to its standard error is asympotically a normal deviate, and these ratios ranged from 2.75 for Working Memory to 9.03 for Choice RT (all p Ͻ .01). Thus, we concluded that there were reliable individual differences in cognitive change for all latent variables. Note that the estimated stability of cognition over the 6-year interval was high, but reliably less than a perfect 1.0. Given reliable variance in change, the correlations of the latent change factors were both meaningful and potentially interpretable. In Table 5 we report the 6-year latent change factor correlations. The change correlations differed from the initial-level correlations in several respects. Changes in Fact Recall correlated highly with changes in Working Memory, Word Recall, and Story Recall. Changes in Word Recall and Story Recall were almost perfectly correlated. Changes in these two memory factors were significantly related to changes in both Perceptual Speed and Induction. Changes in Vocabulary were weakly related to other factors.
Model With Sentence Construction and Listening Span Measuring Working Memory
We also ran a latent change model, substituting the Sentence Construction task for Computation Span as an indicator of the Working Memory latent variable. The model fit the data comparably well, 2 (426)ϭ 543.97, RMSEA ϭ .026, CFI ϭ .984, but the parameter estimates associated with Working Memory change were improper, with implied correlations of Working Memory change with Word Recall change and Text Recall change greater than 1.0. Relaxing the equality constraint on the factor loading for Sentence Construction did not reliably improve the model's fit to the data, 2 (425)ϭ 542.27, RMSEA ϭ .026, CFI ϭ .984, but it did result in better estimates of the latent change variances and covariances. The variance in Working Memory change was not statistically reliable (z ϭ 1.35, p Ͼ .10). In Table 6 we report the rescaled latent change correlations (below the diagonal). Substituting a single measure in the model had a profound effect on the estimated correlations. These estimates can be compared with Table 5 to observe the shift in estimated latent change correlations associated with Working Memory. With Sentence Construction and Listening Span as indicators, the Working Memory change factor was, in essence, perfectly correlated with changes in the two episodic memory factors. The implied correlations, rescaled from the maximum likelihood estimates of the covariances, were greater than 1.0. There were no obvious other problems with the model. Both Sentence Construction and Listening Span had salient loadings on the Working Memory factor; the standardized loadings for Sentence Construction at Wave 1 and Wave 3 were .64 and .69, respectively, whereas the loadings of Listening Span at the two waves were .49 and .68, respectively. As with previous crosssectional analyses with the VLS Sample 1, the Working Memory factor was rotated toward Sentence Construction when it was used as an indicator (Hultsch et al., 1998) . There were no salient LISREL Modification Indices associated with either variable. The problem appeared to be a joint function of (a) a mild ceiling effect for Sentence Construction, (b) greater stability in verbal working memory (the estimated stability coefficient for the new Working Memory latent variable was .94), and (c) different correlations of the Sentence Construction task with the other cognitive variables.
To further compare and contrast results, in Table 6 we also report (above the diagonal) latent change factor correlations estimated from the VLS Sample 1, using only the Sentence Construction measure to define Working Memory at Wave 1 and using all four measures to define Working Memory at Wave 3 (as in Hultsch et al., 1998) .
2 To identify the solution, the residual variance of Sentence Construction was fixed at a value proportional to its estimated residual variance when factored with other working memory measures. Clearly, there were differences between the latent change correlations in the two solutions. One major difference was that changes in Vocabulary were more highly associated with changes in other latent variables in Sample 1. Additionally, changes of Working Memory with the episodic recall variables were much lower in Sample 1. Nevertheless, a number of impor- Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. RT ϭ reaction time.
tant relationships (e.g., the high correlation of changes in Fact Recall and Working Memory) were replicated. These results show that changing the definition of the Working Memory latent variable by shifting the indicators used materially alter the nature of the obtained results. Given the importance of testing processing resource theory by using measures similar to typical crosssectional studies, all structural regression models we report below used the Salthouse working memory measures, not Sentence Construction, to define the Working Memory latent variables.
The Processing-Resource Latent Change Model
Next, we estimated a model for the latent change factors inspired by a processing-resource perspective. The model allowed the initial-level factors to covary freely with each other and with the change factors. Given the high correlation of longitudinal changes in Word Recall and Story Recall, these two variables were modeled as forming a higher order Episodic Memory change factor. The initial solution resulted in a negative unique variance for Story Recall; this parameter was fixed to zero, thereby defining the Episodic Memory change factor by a perfect relationship with Story Recall change. The structural regression equations accounted for the covariances of the latent change factors by treating Perceptual Speed and Working Memory as basic resource variables influencing change in other factors (Salthouse, 1996b) . As in the cross-sectional work of Verhaeghen and Salthouse (1997) , the paths from the basic resources to memory were modeled as partly mediated by Induction change. Based on results from the VLS, Sample 1, we also allowed changes in Fact Recall to predict Episodic Memory change and to be predicted by Working Memory change. Surprisingly, the regression of Induction change on Working Memory change did not approach significance, and so it was trimmed from the model. Likewise, direct effects of changes in Perceptual Speed and Working Memory on Episodic Memory were not reliable and were trimmed from the model. This more restricted model fit the data as well as the longitudinal factor model, 2 (451)ϭ 588.68, RMSEA ϭ .028, CFI ϭ .982. Note that the level of fit is comparable to the latent change factor model, suggesting that the structural regression model fit the covariance matrix of the latent change factors well. Indeed, the change in chi-square, 21.86 (df ϭ 25), which was not statistically significant, and the RMSEA and CFI were equivalent. Figure 1 shows the standardized solution for the structural regressions. Changes in Perceptual Speed predicted changes in both Working Memory and Induction. Changes in Fact Recall and Induction were independent predictors of change in Episodic Memory. The squared multiple correlations (coefficients of determination) were One way to recapture the processing resource logic is to compute indirect (mediated) effects of changes in the resource variables on episodic memory change (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996) . The standardized indirect effects of changes in Perceptual Speed and Working Memory on changes in Episodic Memory were .49 and .41, respectively ( p Ͻ .01).
In cross-sectional data, aging effects are indirectly reflected in relation of chronological age to other variables. In longitudinal data, individual differences in rates of aging are reflected in the latent change factor variances and covariances. Regressions of latent change factors on age reflect the extent to which the average age curves are curvilinear, accelerating at a greater rate for adults who are initially older. The significant effects of chronological age in the model showed that changes in Working Memory were more accelerated in late life than could be expected from individual differences in changes in Perceptual Speed. Likewise, changes in Word Recall were greater in late life, beyond what could be expected from the curvilinear changes in other predictors of Episodic Memory change.
Of course, the model we estimated is only one of a possible set of structural equation models that could fit the existing data. One could question, for example, whether the more complex variables of Fact Recall change and Induction change should mediate the effects of the processing resource variables on memory. We therefore specified a model that eliminated the effects of Fact Recall change and Induction change on Episodic Memory change and instead modeled direct effects of changes in Perceptual Speed and Working Memory on Episodic Memory. This model also fit the data well, 2 (451) ϭ 599.41, RMSEA ϭ .029, CFI ϭ .981, but not quite as well as the accepted model. The model mediating effects of resource variables through Fact Recall change and Induction change was preferred on grounds of empirical fit.
General Cognitive Change Model
Another way of thinking about individual differences in cognitive change in later adulthood is in terms of a general decline that influences performance on all cognitive tasks. Thus, we also fit a model that specified a general, higher order factor of cognitive change (see Hultsch et al., 1998) . The basic measurement model for defining the latent change factors was identical (including the Episodic Memory change factor), but a higher order factor was added as a way of structuring the latent change factor covariances. This factor was identified by fixing the loading of the Induction change factor on the General Cognitive Change second-order factor to 1.0. All residual covariances among latent change factors were fixed to zero except that, by hypothesis, we specified that there would be a correlated residual between the two speed factors, Choice RT change and Perceptual Speed change. This higher order factor model did a very good job of accounting for covariances among latent change factors, 2 (450) ϭ 597.56, RMSEA ϭ .030, CFI ϭ .981; ‚ 2 (24)ϭ 30.74, p Ͼ .05. Figure 2 shows the standardized effects. The general factor of change was marked by high loadings on the Episodic Memory, Fact Recall, Perceptual Speed, Induction, and Working Memory change factors. Squared multiple correlations for these factors were .68, .63, .48, .45, and .46, respectively. Results therefore indicated that a substantial proportion of individual differences in 6-year changes were shared in common across cognitive measures. Given the nature of the latent variable model, however, it was the case that 100 ϫ (1.00 Ϫ .68) ϭ 32% of the variance in Episodic Memory change was independent of the general Cognitive Change factor. Likewise, 52%, 55%, and 54% of the variance in change in Perceptual Speed, Induction, and Working Memory were independent of the general Cognitive Change factor. Thus, there were reliable individual differences in change on each factor that were not associated with other variables. Note that this pattern is quite dissimilar from what might have been expected from cross-sectional models estimating a general factor that captures the bulk of age differences in cognitive tasks (e.g., Allen et al., 2001) .
Discussion
This study used latent change models to evaluate the hypothesis, generated by processing resource theory (Salthouse, 1991 (Salthouse, , 1996b Verhaeghen & Salthouse, 1997) , that age changes in episodic memory covary with age changes in the basic cognitive resources of perceptual speed and working memory. Our models produced evidence that was relatively consistent with expectations derived from previous cross-sectional studies. Hultsch et al. (1998) concluded that the processing resource model fared well in fitting data to VLS Sample 1 but that the important predictor variable was working memory, not speed of processing. The present results are broadly consistent with that conclusion, in the sense that change in working memory was a stronger correlate of changes in episodic memory than changes in Perceptual Speed. Nevertheless, the new data suggest a stronger relationship of processing speed to memory change than had been detected by Hultsch et al. (1998) , who used measures of semantic processing speed as predictors of episodic memory change. The reliable 6-year changes in episodic memory were significantly related to changes in both perceptual speed and working memory, as defined by the Computation Span and Listening Span tasks, respectively.
At the same time, the relationships among the cognitive change latent variables was more complex than a simple matter of the two basic resource variables accounting for changes in episodic memory. A structural regression model showed that any effects of the resource variables were mediated through changes in Fact Recall and Induction. This aspect of the model is actually consistent with the cross-sectional results reported by Verhaeghen and Salthouse (1997) , in which individual differences in reasoning mediated much of the effects of processing speed on memory performance.
An alternative model in which latent changes in each cognitive latent variable were treated as being predicted by a higher order Cognitive Change factor also fit the data well, without positing any direct or indirect prediction of episodic memory change by resource variables. A key feature of this model was that there was reliable loadings of each change factor on the higher order factor, combined with reliable variance in cognitive change for each latent variable that was independent of the higher order factor. These results are partially consistent with resource theory. On the one hand, changes in resource variables are correlated with changes in episodic memory. On the other hand, reliable change in episodic memory occurs that is not associated with these variables; about 32% of the reliable change variance is independent of other cognitive factors. Clearly, changes in speed and working memory cannot provide a sufficient account of episodic memory change in old age.
One important feature of the present results is that longitudinal changes in cognition correlated in ways that could not be anticipated from the large number of cross-sectional studies of processing resource theory. In particular, the importance of Fact Recall for predicting episodic memory change would not be expected on the basis of existing cross-sectional evidence. Virtually all taxonomies of cognitive and intellectual abilities would treat Fact Recall as a facet of crystallized intelligence (e.g., Carroll, 1993; Horn, 1985) and world knowledge and would expect it to behave much like vocabulary. Although the Fact Recall Level and Vocabulary Level latent variables were substantially correlated (and can be modeled as indicators of a higher order crystallized intelligence factor; Hultsch et al., 1998) , they dissociate longitudinally. Changes in Vocabulary are not highly related to changes in Fact Recall, but changes in Fact Recall are highly correlated with changes in Working Memory and Episodic Memory. The central importance of changes in Fact Recall for predicting changes in episodic memory is consistent with earlier findings from the VLS (Hultsch et al., 1998) .
Another critical dissociation of cross-sectional and longitudinal patterns involved the relationship of changes in Induction, or fluid intelligence, and changes in Working Memory. The weak relationship of change in Working Memory to change in Induction found in the present analysis was unexpected. Several studies have suggested a strong relationship of working memory and fluid intelligence, including cross-sectional samples of adults (e.g., Engle et al., 1999; Rogers, Hertzog, & Fisk, 2000) . Indeed, Kyllonen and Christal (1990) once wondered whether fluid intelligence was little more than working memory. Our longitudinal models showed that, to the contrary, working memory and fluid intelligence can be dissociated based on divergent patterns of age-related changes after age 55.
The models reported here suggest the importance of age changes in retrieval mechanisms for driving episodic memory change (Burke & Light, 1981; Zacks et al., 2000) , independent of changes in fluid intelligence. Given the nature of the Nelson and Narens (1980) facts, the most plausible interpretations of longitudinal changes in fact recall in late life are changes in accessibility of knowledge for cued recall in discrete, timed-testing situations. This inference is consistent with other literature (e.g., the increasing likelihood of tip-of-tongue states for older adults; e.g., Burke, MacKay, Worthley, & Wade, 1991; Cohen & Faulkner, 1986 ). The idea is that (a) information incorporated into semantic memory is retained but is possibly inaccessible unless it is used on a regular basis and that (b) aging increases the probability of temporary failures in access. This claim is justified, given what is known about the nature of knowledge representation and maintenance (e.g., Bahrick, 2000; Cohen, 1989) . Nevertheless, direct studies of temporary inaccessibility effects in semantic memory, in conjunction with tasks isolating retrieval failures in episodic tasks, could elucidate the phenomena and set the stage for correlational studies to determine whether declines in retrieval mechanisms required by both types of tasks explains the longitudinal change patterns (see Zacks et al., 2001) .
Note that the mean changes in vocabulary skills were small in magnitude and that individual differences in vocabulary change were not highly correlated with changes in world knowledge. Recognition vocabulary tests provide greater retrieval support than recall tests, and require recognition of definitions of words that may be more frequently accessed than some of the facts used in our fact recall task. The totality of the results, then, favors the argument that normative age changes in fact recall reflect late-life declines in accessibility of infrequently tapped information in semantic memory.
A critical question for resource theory is how one should interpret the substantial correlation of changes in Working Memory with changes in Fact Recall. Often, resource accounts of episodic memory emphasize the importance of working memory resources for supporting encoding operations, including organizational strategies (Bryan, Luszcz, & Pointer, 1999; Hultsch et al., 1998) . Such findings are consistent with divided attention studies showing costs of divided attention at encoding for recall and recognition memory performance (e.g., Anderson, Craik, & Naveh-Benjamin, 1998) . However, it is difficult to argue that reduced working memory capacity would have any impact on encoding of world knowledge, especially knowledge that was gained preexperimentally. One possible account of the substantial relationship is that the kinds of interference effects that may affect working memory span estimates (May et al., 1999) and are known to influence fan effects in episodic retrieval (Radvansky et al., 1996) may also be related to fact retrieval deficits.
Similar concerns exist concerning the proper interpretation of the relationship of Perceptual Speed change to Induction change, as well as the mediation of speed effects on Episodic Memory change through the Induction change latent variable. Salthouse (1996b) has argued that the limited-time and simultaneity mechanisms are indirectly measured by psychometric tests of perceptual speed and that these mechanisms explain why perceptual speed would mediate age changes in reasoning. However, there has been to date little experimental evaluation of these hypothetical mediating mechanisms and their role in perceptual speed test performance or reasoning tasks. Note that, in the models we reported, changes in Choice RT were strongly associated with changes in Perceptual Speed but correlated less with changes in Induction than did changes in Perceptual Speed. For this reason, the processing-resource model could specify Choice RT change as an outcome of Perceptual Speed change, without any direct connection to Induction change.
This pattern could be due to the increased complexity of perceptual speed tests, making them better measures of central resource limitations (Salthouse, 1996b) . Alternatively, the psychometric tests of reasoning and the episodic memory tasks in the VLS may be prone to inflated relations to psychometric tests of perceptual speed because of task design features that increase the importance of processing speed for task performance (see Hertzog, 1989; Hertzog & Bleckley, 2001 ). Age differences in perceptual speed are not always associated with age differences in episodic memory (Dunlosky & Hertzog, 1998) . One cannot rule out the possibility that relationships that are observed are inflated by the speeded nature of encoding and retrieval processes imposed in the memory task (see Salthouse, 1996a) . In the present study, individuals were given relatively brief amounts of study time for both word lists and texts, and speed of processing may be more important for encoding in these tasks than is generally the case.
Another critical issue raised by the present study is the extent to which results can shift when different indicators of latent variables are used. The models from the VLS using different measures of working memory confirm that selection of specific tasks can have surprisingly profound effects on parameter estimates in these kinds of structural equation models. Verbal working memory, as defined by the Sentence Construction and Listening Span tasks, produced lower estimates of individual differences in change than when Computation Span was used to measure working memory; however, the latent Working Memory change variable defined with Sentence Construction was more highly correlated with Episodic Memory change. One critical outcome, then, of the present study is that it shows that longitudinal results obtained by Hultsch et al. (1998) , suggesting that changes in working memory were the most potent predictor of changes in episodic memory, were shaped by use of the Sentence Construction task to define working memory.
In this sense, the multivariate measurement approach used in the VLS appears to be an important, perhaps even critical, feature of research designs addressing processing resource hypotheses. Given that cognition is a complex function of the interplay of multiple mechanisms and that individual cognitive tests or tasks are inevitably a weighted mixture of multiple processing components, it is critical that we understand the variability in outcomes that can occur as a function of selecting some measures, and not others, to define our constructs. Standardization of tasks (Salthouse, Kausler, & Saults, 1988) can be important as a means of establishing a basis for comparison between different studies. However, premature closure on a particular method for measuring a cognitive construct could promote an inference about relations between cognitive constructs that is specific to the mixture of processes in particular tasks rather than a general feature of construct relationships, per se.
The differences between models using the Sentence Construction task versus those using Computation Span warrant further experimental investigation. As noted earlier, Sentence Construction may be contaminated by an affordance for using knowledge to offset working memory capacity limitation. Alternatively, one could argue that a task like Sentence Construction better measures how information held in working memory serves semantic elaboration during encoding. That is, the requirement to form a sentence from the stored words can be viewed as a methodological limitation because of undue support based on verbal knowledge (Salthouse, 1991) or as a better analog of how working memory is used during complex verbal processing. Kintsch's (1998) constructionintegration model for text comprehension is relevant here. One does not store random facts and maintain them in working memory during reading-to the contrary, one constructs rapid inferences about meaning, based in part on knowledge, and then integrates those inferences into a situation model. What is intriguing, then, is the possibility that the Sentence Construction task is more like the way in which working memory must be used during intentional encoding of verbal materials-even in list-learning tasks. New experiments are needed to address these rival accounts.
Finally, this study demonstrates that latent change models can be used to identify reliable individual differences in late-life cognitive change. The models we used can be characterized as a minimalist approach to modeling change, as we noted earlier, but they afforded the use of multiple latent variables in a manner needed for a test of processing resource theory. An important topic for further investigation is the extent to which results from these models would change if alternative growth curve models were used that employed all available data, irrespective of participation history, and which utilized age as a way of indexing change. Such models would be more tractable if fewer latent constructs were included in the model. Be that as it may, the latent change models described here have advanced our understanding of changes in cognition in later adulthood. They can also serve as a basis for models using measured characteristics of individuals such as health status and lifestyle to predict individual differences in cognitive change (see Hultsch, Hertzog, Small, & Dixon, 1999) . When used in concert with experimental studies that clarify the cognitive processes that govern task performance, the methods described here can provide a powerful window into the nature of adult cognitive development. Indeed, we believe that optimal use of modeling approaches involves an integration of the types of models we report here with ongoing experimental studies that elucidate mechanisms and test alternative processing explanations of patterns observed in the longitudinal data.
